Rule Definition
A rule, in the context of social science, refers to a specification of regularity within social behaviour. While traditionally viewed as a mechanism that causally generates actions, a more nuanced sociological perspective posits that social behaviour is better understood as following rules rather than being strictly caused. This view suggests that human actions are intrinsically meaningful, deriving their meaning from adherence to social norms and rules, which are themselves socially constructed through the appeal of others’ compliance.
Philosophical Foundations
The philosophical treatment of rules in social science is often rooted in the work of thinkers like P. Winch (1958), who argued that human behaviour is intrinsically meaningful. For Winch, connections between actions are conceptual rather than strictly causal; individuals do not cause their actions by reference to reasons, but rather follow rules which are inherently social. The giving of meaning to an action is thus a function of following these social rules, as adherence to them is the only mechanism for determining whether an attribution of meaning is accurate or incorrect.
Dimensions of Rules
The concept of rules operates on several levels:
* Regulative Aspect: This refers to the more mundane function where rules merely control actions within established social institutions.
* Constitutive Aspect: This aspect relates to the broader role of rules in expanding freedom, such as providing the basis for social institutions that introduce predictability and ease social behaviour.
Rule-Following and Freedom
The concept of rule-following can be understood in a narrower sense as the production of regularity by agents who possess the capacity to choose otherwise, linking the concept to notions of free will. Even when a rule restricts an actor’s freedom (e.g., being someone else’s rule), it can still represent an enlargement of freedom by establishing social structures that bring order and predictability.
Critiques and Context
Sociological approaches often examine rules in their complexity, yet critics have questioned whether ‘social rules’ can be equated with legalistic concepts such as ‘law’, citing the perceived ‘scientistic’ nature of some empiricist views (e.g., Parsons’ conception of a norm). Furthermore, for rule-following to occur effectively, the source material suggests that rule specifications must be embedded within specific contexts of practice and material circumstances; rules are inherently ‘open’, meaning behaviour in particular situations is only defeasibly construable according to the rule.

