Intentionality

Intentionality Definition

Intentionality is a concept originating in philosophy that refers generally to the property of mental states being directed towards or being ‘about’ something. While often used loosely by social scientists, philosophers employ the term to distinguish mental phenomena from physical ones, arguing that mental states possess a quality of ‘aboutness’ that physical phenomena lack. This concept is central to understanding how awareness and beliefs structure our experience of the world, making it relevant in fields such as sociology when investigating how social reality is constructed through shared ideas and perceptions.

Philosophical Origins and Meaning

The philosophical study of intentionality has deep historical roots, traceable back to figures like Parmenides, but gained significant focus during the classical and medieval periods before being formally developed by the phenomenologist Franz Brentano (1838–1917). For Brentano, mental states are considered intentional insofar as they possess a specific content. This content distinguishes them from non-content-bearing affective states, such as depression, which do not require reference to an existing state of affairs for coherence. The debate surrounding intentionality has led to philosophical dualism, as arguments suggested that the qualitative difference between mental and physical states implies a fundamental separation between the mind and the brain.

Nuances and Conceptual Scope

Intentionality is broader than simply possessing intentions or purposes. As argued by thinkers such as Schutz and the ethnomethodologists, intentionality encompasses more subtle forms of actor knowledgeability, including practical consciousness or ‘practical knowledge’ (as discussed by Giddens), alongside discursive consciousness. In the context of social study, when symbolic interactionists or ethnomethodologists examine how actors interpret and make sense of the social world, they are empirically investigating intentionality.

Intentional Stance

The concept is further explored in relation to the ‘intentional stance’, a perspective that shifts focus away from unobservable internal psychological states towards public events and the external environment. This view posits that intentional talk effectively attributes intentional states to individuals, which forms part of the public calculus used for predicting behaviour. Fundamental to this stance is the mutual recognition between actors regarding each other’s interpretations of actions as intentional.